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Abstract 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that US industrial firms invest heavily in noncash, risky 
financial assets. Using hand-collected data on financial portfolios of German firms, we show that 
risky asset holdings are not an anomaly unique to the US. We find that industrial firms in 
Germany invest 11.6% of their financial assets in noncash and risky assets. Value-weighted, this 
percentage increases to 25.4%. While the equally-weighted average is substantial, it is clearly lower 
(5 percentage points or 30% in relative terms) than that in the US. After accounting for cross-
country compositional differences (especially the dominance of large firms in the US technology 
sector), this difference in risky financial asset holdings decreases but remains at 3 percentage 
points. The remaining difference is driven by institutional differences that affect the relationship 
between firm characteristics and risky financial asset holdings in the two countries. In contrast to 
the US, German firms largely follow the precautionary savings motive and do not seem to 
misappropriate their funds when shifting them towards riskier asset allocations. Our results have 
implications for how asset management by nonfinancial firms should be regulated. 
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Over the past decades, corporate cash holdings have received considerable attention from academics 
and management practitioners. For many firm executives, managing corporate liquidity ranks among 
the most important tasks they face (e.g., Graham and Harvey, 2001). The key assumption in most 
studies examining corporate cash holdings is that firms hold cash or risk-free, near-cash assets – often 
referred to as CHE 1. In contrast, two recent studies for the US (Duchin et al., 2017; Darmouni and 
Mota, 2020) show that firms also invest in noncash and – to a large extent – in risky financial assets 
(such as mutual funds and equities). This broad range of securities in which nonfinancial firms invest 
results in financial portfolios2 that are significantly larger than those identified by the traditional 
measure of corporate cash holdings, namely, CHE (Duchin et al., 2017). Thus, these findings challenge 
existing studies on corporate cash holdings in two ways: First, CHE underestimates the size of firms’ 
actual financial portfolios. Second, risky financial asset holdings fail to protect firms from adverse 
cash flow shocks, as risky financial assets often decrease in value when firms need their precautionary 
savings most and other sources of funding are unavailable or excessively costly. 
However, it is not clear if these findings are only confined to the US or if they generalize to other 
countries with different country-specific conditions. In fact, the US results are seriously affected by 
two US-specific phenomena. First, the special features of the US accounting and tax systems affect a 
firm’s financial portfolio size and likely also affect its financial portfolio composition. In particular, 
previous studies show that the US repatriation tax leads to an accumulation of (foreign) cash holdings 
in the financial portfolios of firms (e.g., Foley et al., 2007; Faulkender, Hankins and Petersen, 2019). 
While most developed countries have territorial taxation without a repatriation tax, the US has had 
                                      
1 CHE is the Compustat abbreviation for the empirical standard measure of corporate cash holdings and consists of the sum 
of firms’ balance sheet accounts labeled “cash and cash equivalents” and “short-term investments”. 
2 We define a firm’s financial portfolio as the sum of its cash holdings and any other nonoperating securities that are likely 
held for liquidity purposes. While most of the previous work on this topic focuses solely on firms’ cash holdings, certain 
more recent studies also examine possible cash substitutes such as financial assets in general (e.g., Duchin et al., 2017; 
Darmouni and Mota, 2020), credit lines (e.g., Sufi, 2009; Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2013; Acharya et al., 2014) and 




a worldwide tax system with a repatriation tax.3 Second, previous US studies are affected by the 
massive size of firms in the US technology industry (including firms such as Apple, Google, or 
Microsoft). Specifically, the financial portfolios of technology firms are among the largest (e.g., 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) and riskiest (e.g., Duchin et al., 2017).4 Thus, without analyzing 
financial portfolios outside the very specific US context (i.e., in the absence of the rather unique tax 
regulation and the large US technology firms), it is difficult to determine whether the previous results 
based on US data can be generalized to other countries. 
In this paper, we begin filling this gap by empirically analyzing financial portfolios in the largest 
economy in Europe (Germany). Our study is the first one on this subject outside the US and provides 
new evidence on both the size and the composition of firms’ financial portfolios. To the extent that 
we find results similar to those found in the US, we underscore the relevance of those previous results. 
To the extent that we find differences, we provide complementary evidence in addition to that of 
prior findings. Germany is a particularly good example to use for our analysis. It has country-specific 
conditions representative of many continental European and East Asian countries (e.g., La Porta et 
al., 1998); however, these conditions are nevertheless different from those in the US. Germany has a 
territorial tax system, and manufacturing firms are responsible for a large part of the German gross 
domestic product. Our empirical analysis relies on a comprehensive, hand-collected data set 
encompassing the financial portfolios of the largest nonfinancial firms in Germany. 
In terms of financial portfolio size, we find that German firms invest an average of 16.2% of their 
book assets in (both safe and risky) financial assets. This percentage is only 3.7% larger than the 
empirical standard measure of corporate cash holdings, CHE. Thus, unlike the results found in the 
US, our results suggest that CHE is a reasonably good proxy for financial portfolio size. These results 
                                      
3 At the end of 2011, 26 of the 34 OECD countries taxed only income generated within their national boarders, regardless 
of where the taxpayer was located (territorial tax system). Eight countries taxed domestic firms on all their income, 
regardless of where the income was generated (worldwide tax system). The United States is one of these eight countries and 
the only G-7 country that has a worldwide tax system. Following the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which became 
effective on January 1, 2018, the US tax system changed to a hybrid system with elements of both major tax systems.  
4 For example, the article “U.S. Government Has Less Cash Than Apple,” which was published in Forbes Online on July 




have implications for the conclusions drawn from previous studies. For instance, Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith, and Servaes (2003) or Guney, Ozkan, and Ozkan (2007) find that US firms hold less cash than 
German firms. As CHE substantially underestimates the sizes of actual financial portfolios in the US 
but not in Germany, the observed cross-country differences in “corporate liquidity” documented by 
previous research could be caused by ignoring parts of the total financial portfolio in the US.  
Examining the composition of financial portfolios, we find considerable cross-country differences in 
the portion of the financial portfolio invested in risky assets (see Figure 1), even though total financial 
portfolio sizes are similar in both countries. Equally-weighted, the average firm in Germany invests 
11.6% of its financial portfolio in risky assets. While risky asset holdings in Germany are substantial, 
this percentage is considerably lower than that of US firms. The average German firm holds 5 
percentage points (or 30% in relative terms) fewer risky assets in its financial portfolio than the 
average US firm, which invests 16.6% of its financial portfolio in risky assets (Duchin et al., 2017). 
Value-weighted, firms’ risky financial asset holdings are substantially higher in both countries. In 
Germany, the percentage increases to 25.4% of the average firm’s financial assets. As value-weighted 
statistics account for the importance of results from the perspective of the overall economy, this 
finding raises questions about required policy interventions regarding nonfinancial firms’ asset 
management activities in Germany. Overall, our results emphasize that despite general similarities in 
firms’ financial policies, cross-country differences in their financial portfolio management exist.  
 
Figure 1. This figure compares the financial portfolio composition (i.e., the ratio of risky financial assets 
to total financial assets) of the average firm in Germany with that of the average firm in the US for the 
years 2009-2012. Data on US firms’ financial portfolios are from Duchin et al. (2017). Value-weighted US 
data are year 2012 only. 





To conduct a more thorough analysis of these on-average results, we empirically investigate the 
determinants of financial portfolio size and composition in Germany and compare them with those 
suggested by previous US studies. Beginning with the analysis of financial portfolio size, our cross-
sectional results provide evidence that the traditional motives for holding cash – the transaction cost 
and the precautionary savings motives (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009) – are 
important determinants of the size of German firms’ financial portfolios. However, in contrast to the 
studies on corporate liquidity for the US (e.g., Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008), we find no 
evidence that agency problems have a significant impact on the size of firms’ financial portfolios.  
Regarding financial portfolio composition, our cross-sectional results show that firms mitigate the 
risks from adverse cash flow shocks not only by increasing the size of their financial portfolios but 
also by adjusting the composition of their financial investments – more specifically, they do this by 
decreasing the risk exposure of their financial portfolios. Thus, in contrast to the inconclusive results 
obtained in the US (e.g., Duchin et al., 2017), our findings suggest that the precautionary savings 
motive also affects financial portfolio composition, i.e., firms’ relative allocation between safe and risk 
financial assets. In fact, we find a negative relationship between firms’ risky financial asset holdings 
and different proxies for precautionary saving needs. For cash flow volatility (the precautionary 
savings proxy that produces the most conservative results in terms of standardized coefficients), an 
increase of a one standard deviation leads to a decrease of 0.38 standard deviations (7.1 percentage 
points) in the portion of a firm’s financial portfolio invested in risky assets. In addition, and in contrast 
to the US, there is no evidence that agency problems are responsible for firms’ higher risky portfolio 
investments. These results contradict the view that a breakdown of corporate governance may lead 
to high levels of risky financial asset holdings and dispel concerns about potentially value-reducing 
activities by firm management. We also find that, similar to the US, risky assets of German firms are 
concentrated in financially unconstrained firms with large financial portfolios.  
Since German firms are on average smaller and operate in different industries than US firms, concerns 
may arise that our on-average findings are mainly driven by differences in firm characteristics. To 
address this concern, we use a methodology that is relatively new to the field of empirical corporate 
finance but well known in labor economics (e.g., from decomposing the gender pay gap) to study the 




(Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). In doing so, we use our regression results and decompose the cross-
country differences in risky financial assets into an explained component (resulting from compositional 
differences in firm characteristics; the “covariate effect”) and an unexplained component (resulting 
from effect size differences in regression point estimates; the “coefficient effect”). The unexplained 
component can be interpreted as a country-specific treatment effect (e.g., Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 
2011). That is, it can be viewed as a country-specific effect that explains the difference in risky 
financial asset holdings that remains after accounting for group differences in firm characteristics. Our 
findings reveal that after accounting for compositional differences (e.g., the massive size of firms in 
the US technology industry), German firms still place 3 percentage points (or 18% in relative terms) 
less of their investments in risky financial assets than US firms. This finding is consistent with the 
view that certain country-specific effects, which are not present in Germany, partly drive US results.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related literature. Section 
3 describes our sample construction and presents summary statistics. Section 4 shows the size and 
composition of the examined firms’ financial portfolios. Section 5 presents our empirical predictions 
and examines the determinants of financial portfolio size and composition in terms of risk. Section 6 
uses our previous results to decompose the cross-country differences in (risky) financial assets between 
German and US firms. Section 7 discusses policy implications and presents conclusions. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Our work is related and contributes to several strands of the corporate finance literature. There is a 
growing number of papers that examine the size, properties and composition of industrial firms’ “cash” 
holdings (e.g., Duchin et al., 2017; Darmouni and Mota, 2020; Chen and Duchin, 2019; Brown, 2014; 
Cardella, Fairhurst, and Klasa, 2015) – using samples of US firms. In contrast to the assumption 
made by the traditional studies on cash holdings, these papers show that US firms also invest in 
noncash and risky financial assets. These papers find that firms’ actual financial portfolios are 
significantly larger than those identified by the traditional measure of corporate cash holdings, CHE. 
We complement these studies with the first analysis of the size and composition of firms’ financial 
portfolios outside the specific US context. In doing so, we provide new evidence on the broader 




From a more general perspective, our findings have implications for the classical literature on 
corporate cash holdings, as financial assets can fund growth opportunities and mitigate adverse shocks 
just as well as actual cash. The predominant explanation for why firms hold cash is the precautionary 
savings motive. According to this view, firms hold cash to protect themselves against adverse cash 
flow shocks when other sources of funding are unavailable or excessively costly. For example, Kim, 
Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Faulkender and Wang (2006), Bates, Kahle, and 
Stulz (2009), Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) and Duchin (2010) find empirical evidence suggesting 
that firms use cash holdings to reduce their financial distress costs resulting from possible adverse 
cash flow shocks. Our results complement these findings by showing that firms in our sample (in 
contrast to US firms) mitigate the risks related to adverse cash flow shocks not only by increasing the 
size of their financial portfolios but also by adjusting the composition of their financial portfolios – 
more specifically by decreasing the risk exposure of their financial portfolio. Thus, German firms’ 
financial policies related to risky financial asset holdings are consistent with the precautionary savings 
motive. 
Finally, our work adds to the small literature that examines the cross-country variation in corporate 
cash holdings.5 Most of the previous work in this area focuses on the impact of institutional conditions, 
such as laws and law enforcement, on firms’ cash holdings. For example, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and 
Servaes (2003) find evidence that firms in countries with weak shareholder protection rights have 
higher cash holdings because agency problems can occur more frequently. In line with Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith, and Servaes (2003), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) and Kalcheva and Lins (2007) 
show that cash holdings are valued more highly in countries with strong shareholder protection rights. 
While the previous work examining international data only focuses on firms’ cash holdings, we analyze 
firms’ total financial portfolio. 
  
                                      
5 The literature on corporate liquidity and cash holdings almost exclusively focuses on samples of US firms (see Almeida et 




3. Data Description and Sample Selection 
3.1. Financial Asset Data 
The empirical literature generally defines cash holdings as firms’ “cash and short-term investments”6, 
which are often referred to as CHE. CHE is a Compustat abbreviation and typically encompasses 
short-term financial assets with maturities of up to 90 days at issuance and/or securities that are 
intended to be liquidated within one year. Any other financial assets, such as corporate bonds or 
equities, are typically held in balance sheet accounts outside of CHE. In particular, these assets are 
held in the accounts “long-term investments” and “other assets”. As these financial assets outside of 
CHE can fund growth opportunities or mitigate adverse shocks just as well as financial assets inside 
of it, CHE alone may considerably underestimate a firm’s actual liquidity.7 
Because the size and composition of firms’ total financial asset portfolios are not available in 
commercial databases, we hand-collect these data from the footnotes of the annual reports of all 
industrial firms included in the three largest German stock indices – the DAX (the 30 largest blue 
chip stocks), the MDAX (the 50 prime standard shares that rank below the DAX), and the TecDAX 
(the 30 largest prime standard shares of the technology sector) – for the years between 2009 and 
2012.8 For this purpose, we closely follow the data collection algorithm of Duchin et al. (2017) and 
Darmouni and Mota (2020). Based on this procedure, we collect data on firms’ financial assets, which 
comprise both (1) the balance sheet accounts “cash and cash equivalents” and “short-term investments” 
and (2) any other nonoperating financial assets included in the balance sheet accounts “long-term 
                                      
6 More precisely, “cash and short-term investments” consists of the sum of the firms’ balance sheet accounts “cash and cash 
equivalents” and “short-term investments”. 
7 The balance sheet accounts “long-term investments” and “other assets” include financial assets with maturities of more 
than 90 days at issuance and/or securities intended to be liquidated after more than one year. 
8 We carry out our analyses over the same sample period as in Duchin et al. (2017) to facilitate comparisons with their US 
results and to dissect between-country differences into compositional and structural parts (see Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
in Section 6). This sample period is also representative for firms’ actual financial and risky asset investments in both 
countries. Total levels in (risky) financial assets for the year 2018 are very similar to those during the sample period 2009 




investments” or “other assets” (see Appendix A1 for details on the data collection procedure). To 
focus on nonoperating financial assets, we exclude all financial asset positions that are earmarked for 
labor payments or operational purposes other than liquidity management (such as “pension assets”, 
“derivatives”, “receivables”, and “strategic investments”). We refer to the total amount of a firm’s 
financial assets as the firm’s financial portfolio or the firm’s financial asset holdings. Our data 
collection procedure exploits the disclosure requirements under IAS 39 and IFRS 7. These 
requirements mandate firms to disclose the fair values of their financial assets along with the 
procedures used. These requirements are similar to those stipulated by SFAS No. 157, which allows 
us to make direct comparisons of the results in this study with previous findings from the US without 
making adjustments for differences in accounting.9 
 
3.2. Sample Selection 
In our study, we focus on the largest public firms in Germany. We create a sample comprising all 
firms in the DAX, MDAX, and TecDAX indices, which we refer to as HDAX firms. Following the 
literature, we drop all financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999), which 
leaves us with 73 industrial firms and 269 firm-year observations. Finally, to reduce the effect of 
outliers on our results, we winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
We report summary statistics in Table 1. To directly compare our results with previous findings from 
the US, this table also contains results from the study of Duchin et al. (2017), who examine the 
financial portfolios of S&P 500 firms for the same sample period. On average, firms in our sample 
have financial portfolios that represent 16.2% of their book assets; this percentage is only 0.5 
percentage points higher than that estimated with CHE, the traditional measure of cash used in the 
literature.10 With a standard deviation of 12.6%, firms’ financial portfolios also show a wide variation. 
                                      
9 The key requirements for the fair value disclosure of financial assets under IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP are identical (e.g., 
Hitz, 2007). For our sample period, the major difference is that US-GAAP specifies major asset classes for the disaggregation 
of financial assets, while IAS/IFRS does not. For a detailed comparison, see Table IA1 of the Internet Appendix. 




The median firm holds 12.1% of its book assets in financial assets, which indicates that the distribution 
of financial portfolios is skewed to the right in the cross-section. Table 1 also characterizes the different 
firm-level variables that we employ in this study. The table reveals a large amount of variation in the 
explanatory variables that the literature identifies as determinants of firms’ financial portfolios (e.g., 
Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009). For instance, the proxies for firms’ distress costs, 
namely, R&D expenditures relative to book assets and the market-to-book ratio, have means of 2.5% 
and 1.6 and standard deviations of 3.8% and 0.8, respectively. In addition, Table 1 enables cross-
country comparisons between Germany and the US. The table reveals that the two samples show 
considerable differences in their composition. On average, German firms are smaller and have lower 
market-to-book ratios than their US counterparts. Table A2 of the Appendix gives detailed definitions 
for the variables included in Table 1. 
<< Insert Table 1 >> 
 
4. Size and Composition of Corporate Financial Portfolios 
4.1. Size and Types of Financial Asset Holdings  
This section offers a more detailed picture of corporate financial asset portfolios and the various types 
of financial assets held by firms. To focus our analysis, we group firms’ financial assets based on their 
characteristics and risk profiles into the following broad asset classes: cash and cash equivalents, 
deposits, commercial paper, money market funds, bond investments, equity investments, asset-backed 
securities, and other securities. To allow for as much granularity as possible, we classify equity 
investments into “mutual funds” and “equities”. For bond investments, we further distinguish between 
“domestic government bonds”, “foreign government bonds” and “corporate bonds”. Whenever possible, 
we manually assign the hand-collected financial asset data to these asset classes. However, IAS 39 
and IFRS 7 allow firms some flexibility in defining their reported asset classes. In particular, the 
standards allow firms to aggregate their assets “into classes of similar instruments” (IFRS 7.6). As a 
consequence, a few firms report distinct financial asset classes but also an aggregated position, which 




Table 2 (Panel A) shows the sample-wide means of firms’ financial portfolios by asset class relative 
to (1) total book assets, (2) the size of the total financial asset portfolios and (3) CHE. The table also 
contains results from Duchin et al. (2017), who examine financial portfolios of S&P 500 firms. We 
evaluate the size and detailed structure of German firms’ financial portfolios and later compare our 
results to those found in the US. 
<< Insert Table 2 >> 
The size of firms’ financial portfolios: Panel A of Table 2 (column 1, last row) shows that firms’ 
financial portfolios represent, on average, 16.2% of book assets. This number is only 1.3 percentage 
points lower than the 17.5% of book assets observed among industrial firms in the US.11 Moreover, 
we find that firms’ financial portfolios, on average, are only 3.7% larger than the standard measure 
of cash holdings CHE, while financial portfolios of US firms are 16.9% larger (see columns 5 and 6 of 
Panel A). This considerable difference between Germany and the US suggests that German firms hold 
only a few financial assets outside of CHE; additionally, it indicates that CHE is a reasonably good 
proxy for the size of German firms’ financial portfolios, while it markedly underestimates financial 
portfolio size of US firms. The reason for this finding is that US firms hold a higher portion of their 
financial portfolios in asset classes that are typically liquidated after more than one year (such as 
equities and asset-backed securities), i.e., long-term investments. Figure 2 illustrates this finding by 
reorganizing the data in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2. The figure compares the financial asset 
composition (as a percentage of CHE) of US and German firms and breaks down non-cash financial 
assets by investment horizon (short- vs. long-term; brick 1) and risk (safe vs. risky; brick 2). Firms 
in the US hold a substantial amount of assets for the purpose of investing long-term (brick 1 in the 
right chart of Figure 2; 16.9% of the size of CHE). In Germany, the amount of these “long-term 
investments” is comparatively low (brick 1 in the left chart; only 3.7% of the size of CHE).  
                                      
11 In Section 6, we study these mean outcome differences (and those of subsequent statistics) using the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition. For total financial portfolio size, we show that the mean group difference between booth countries almost 





Figure 2. This figure compares the financial asset composition (as a percentage of CHE) of German and 
US firms. Brick 1 breaks down firms’ financial assets (without cash) in short-term (ST) or long-term (LT) 
securities. Brick 2 shows a similar breakdown of firms’ financial assets (without cash) but based on the 
safe-risky-classification scheme. Most firms’ safe financial assets (without cash) are held in short-term 
investments. Data on US firms’ financial portfolio composition is from Duchin et al. (2017). 
 
The types of firms’ financial asset holdings: Table 2 (Panel A) also shows that German firms, on 
average, invest the bulk of their portfolios in financial assets that represent cash or cash equivalents. 
In total, the asset classes cash and cash equivalents, deposits, commercial paper and money market 
funds constitute 88.1% of firms’ financial portfolios (see column 3 of Panel A, rows 1-4). The remaining 
portion of these portfolios consists of bonds (6.0%) and a few equities (0.2%). Investments in asset-
backed securities are virtually nonexistent. These results are in stark contrast to those found in the 
US. US firms have substantially lower cash levels; they invest only 69.0% of their financial portfolio 
in cash or cash equivalents, which is 11.5% less than the amount that German firms invest. Instead, 
the average US firm invests two times more of its assets in bonds and eight times more of its assets 
in equities than the average German firm. US firms also invest a considerable amount in asset-backed 
securities (1.4% of financial assets).  
 
4.2. Safe and Risky Financial Asset Holdings 
Next, we examine the role of risk in firms’ financial portfolios. In the US, industrial firms hold a 
considerable amount of their financial assets in risky asset classes; indeed, risky securities represent 
16.6% of the average firm’s financial portfolio (Duchin et al., 2017). These investment activities of US 
firms question the traditional boundaries between financial and nonfinancial firms and increasingly 




raise concerns about an essentially unregulated shadow hedge fund industry with minimal regulation 
and disclosure requirements. 
Following the literature, we assess the riskiness of firms’ financial assets based on the Federal Reserve’s 
classification of securities (Anderson and Kavajecz, 1994). We classify assets that the Federal Reserve 
labels “money-like” as safe assets. Safe assets comprise cash and cash equivalents, deposits, commercial 
paper, money market funds and domestic government bonds. We classify all remaining “non-money-
like” assets as risky assets. These assets include corporate and foreign government bonds, equities, 
asset-backed securities, aggregated accounts, and other securities. Our approach is identical to the 
one used by Duchin et al. (2017), which facilitates the comparison of our results to those found in the 
US. 
According to this asset classification scheme, we split the securities presented in Panel A of Table 2 
into “safe” and “risky” financial assets (the asset classes above/below the dotted line). Table 2 (Panel 
B) reports the resulting risky/safe financial assets mix for the average firm and contains also the 
corresponding results from Duchin et al. (2017) to allow for cross-country comparisons. The panel 
shows that the average German firm in our sample holds the vast majority (88.4%) of its financial 
assets in safe assets and 11.6% in risky financial assets. While the risky asset holdings of German 
firms are substantial, the fraction of risky assets of US firms is 16.6%, i.e., about 5 percentage points 
(or 43%) higher. Risky asset holdings of the average German firm are also smaller than those held by 
the average US firm when we relate them to total book assets (CHE). German firms invest 2.3% of 
book assets (13.3% of CHE) in risky financial asset classes. This number is about twice as high in the 
US (4.8% of book assets; or 25.4% of CHE).12 
The numbers in Panel A and Panel B also reveal a commonality related to firms’ non-cash financial 
assets between firms in both countries. While there are clear differences in the levels of non-cash 
financial assets, the risky/safe financial assets mix within them is similar for firms in both countries. 
                                      
12 As discussed in footnote 8, we analyze the same sample as in Duchin et al. (2017) to facilitate comparisons with their US 
results. In Table IA2 of the Internet Appendix, we show that the main results of this section are qualitatively and statistically 





This asset mix is most easily seen by returning to Figure 2 (bricks 2 in both charts). The figure shows 
that there is a 61-62% risky/38-39% safe asset mix within non-cash financial assets. However, the 
figure also reveals the marked differences in the overall levels of non-cash financial assets (21.2% vs. 
41.5% of the size of CHE).  
While we provide equally weighted analyses throughout this paper, we also report analogous value 
weighted statistics in Table A3 of the Appendix. These numbers allow us to assess the role of risk in 
nonfinancial firms’ financial portfolios from the perspective of the whole economy, which is indicative 
for the importance of firms’ risky asset management activities in the aggregate. Specifically, Table A3 
reveals that our qualitative conclusions in terms of risk remain unchanged if we consider value 
weighted statistics. Compared to firms in the US, German firms still hold a substantial but smaller 
percentage of their financial portfolio in risky assets. However, the value-weighted average firm level 
of risky financial assets of firms in both countries is even about 50% higher than that of the respective 
equally-weighted average firm level. German (US) firms hold a value-weighted average of 25.4% 
(38.3%) of their financial portfolio in risky asset classes. This finding further supports our previous 
finding that risky assets represent an economically large portion of German firms’ financial portfolio.   
Overall, our results indicate that, on average, total financial portfolios of firms in Germany and the 
US are quite similar in terms of size (as measured by the financial assets to book assets ratio) but 
differ in terms of their composition with respect to risk. German firms hold an economically substantial 
but smaller fraction of their financial portfolios in risky asset classes than US firms. 
 
4.3. Concentration of Risky Financial Asset Holdings and Industry-Level Effects 
In this section, we examine the distribution of risky financial assets across firms and industries in 
more detail. We form portfolios by sorting firms into quintiles based on their risky financial asset 
holdings using the two measures introduced above: (i) risky financial assets/financial assets, i.e., the 
share of risky assets in a firm’s total financial asset portfolio, and (ii) risky financial assets/book assets. 
Then, we report the within-quintile mean of risky financial assets (computed for the respective 
measure that constructs the quintiles).  




For the years 2009-2012, Panel A of Table 3 reveals a substantial concentration of risky financial 
asset holdings. The bulk of risky financial assets are concentrated in the top quintile of German 
companies. In the top quintile, risky financial assets, on average, account for 44.5% of firms’ financial 
portfolios. In stark contrast, firms in the bottom quintiles hold almost no risky assets in their portfolios: 
the firms in the lowest quintile do not invest in risky financial assets at all; the firms in quintiles two 
and three hold only a negligible 0.2% and 2.7%, respectively, of their assets in risky asset classes. Of 
course, since the quintiles are formed by sorting firms according to their risky financial asset holdings, 
it is not surprising that the quintile means in Panel A increase monotonically. Nevertheless, the 
relatively small increase from quintile one to three indicates that the distribution of firms’ risky 
financial asset holdings is skewed to the right in the German cross-section. Overall, these results reveal 
that the (equally-weighted) on-average evidence (that firms invest 11.6% of their financial portfolio 
in risky assets) is largely driven by the top quintile of firms. Excluding the top quintile would 
substantially reduce the mean risky financial asset holdings of the equally-weighted average firm from 
11.6% to 3.5%. 
Next, we turn to a deeper analysis of firms in the top quintile shown in Panel A. Column 6 shows 
data for the 10 largest holders of risky assets. To allow for cross-country comparisons, we also show 
the data for the top 10 US firms in column 7.13 Panel A shows that the average share of risky assets 
held by the top 10 German firms is 54.2% for 2012. In contrast, the average share of risky assets held 
by the top 10 US firms is massive, namely, 91.8%, i.e., approximately 70% larger than that of German 
firms. Not even one German company invests more in risky financial assets than any of the top 10 
US companies (unreported): the German top 10 firm with the largest share of risky assets, K+S, holds 
approximately 72.7% of its total financial portfolio in risky assets, which is substantially smaller than 
the 85.9% held by Qualcomm (the US top 10 firm with the smallest share of risky assets). 
For completeness, Panel B provides similar analyses of the share of risky financial assets relative to 
book assets. This ratio is indicative of how important a firm’s risky financial asset holdings are in 
terms of its total economic resources. The results with the alternative ratio are qualitatively similar.    
                                      
13 Firm-level data for the top 10 holders of risky assets in the US are only available for the year 2012 (see Duchin et al., 




Finally, we investigate the composition of risky financial asset holdings at the industry-level using the 
Fama and French (1997) five-industry classification scheme. Table 4 breaks down German and US 
firms’ risky financial assets holdings by industry. Duchin et al. (2017) find that technology and 
healthcare firms hold substantially more (in fact, more than twice as many) risky financial assets than 
firms in all the other sectors. For instance, US technology firms invest, on average, 26.9% of their 
financial assets in risky asset classes; healthcare firms invest 26.4%. Firms in all the other industries 
have considerably smaller risky financial asset holdings comprising 10.1% to 12.3% of their financial 
assets. Similarly, we identify industry concentrations of risky financial asset holdings for Germany, 
albeit in completely different sectors than those found in the US. Risky assets of German firms are 
primarily concentrated in consumer goods firms (18.1%) and firms classified as “other” (28.4%), while 
firms from the other industries hold substantially lower levels of risky assets, ranging from 5.4% to 
12.1% of their financial portfolio.   
<< Insert Table 4 >> 
 
5. Determinants of the Size and Composition of Financial Portfolios 
5.1. Empirical Predictions 
Thus far, our findings suggest that marked cross-country differences in the financial portfolios of firms 
exist (see Section 4). To allow for a more thorough analysis of these cross-country differences, we 
analyze the factors that explain the cross-sectional variation in both, the size of financial asset holdings 
and their composition (i.e., the split between safe and risky assets) and contrast these results with 
those from the US. This analysis is crucial given the scarce evidence about whether the US-centric 
view of corporate liquidity management generalizes to other countries as well (see Almeida et al., 
2014, for a discussion). We also use the cross-sectional results to decompose and further analyze the 
causes of the mean outcome differences between Germany and the US in subsequent sections.  
Financial portfolio size: Given that financial asset holdings provide corporate liquidity, the previous 
literature treats corporate financial assets as if they are perfect substitutes for cash.  This suggests 
that the factors that motivate firms to hold cash may also determine firms’ financial asset holdings 




benefits of holding cash. The costs commonly associated with cash holdings are lower returns due to 
a liquidity premium (e.g., Kim, Mauer, and Sherman, 1998) and possible tax disadvantages compared 
to shareholders holding cash directly (e.g., Miller, 1986; Masulis and Trueman, 1988). Firms gain two 
main benefits through holding cash. First, they avoid the transaction costs related to raising funds or 
liquidating assets that are incurred when firms do not hold enough cash to make their payments (e.g., 
Baumol, 1952; Miller and Orr, 1966). Second, they can use cash to finance projects when other sources 
of funding are unavailable or unreasonably costly (e.g., Kim, Mauer, and Sherman, 1998; Almeida et 
al., 2014). The literature refers to the first benefit as the transaction cost motive and the second one, 
originally suggested by Keynes (1936), as the precautionary savings motive. This leads to our first 
two hypotheses about financial portfolio size: 
H1: Financial portfolio size increases with firms’ transaction costs. 
H2: Financial portfolio size increases with firms’ precautionary savings demand. 
However, managers and shareholders differ in terms of their perceptions about the costs and benefits 
of holding cash (e.g., Opler et al., 1999). Firms’ management may want to hold excess cash to pursue 
their own objectives at the expense of their shareholders (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). 
Therefore, we expect that firms where agency problems between managers and shareholders are more 
severe (i.e., those with weak corporate governance) hold more financial assets (the agency motive).  
H3: Financial portfolio size increases with agency problems/weaker governance. 
 
Financial portfolio composition: We also analyze the factors that affect the composition of financial 
asset holdings (i.e., the split between safe and risky assets). In line with Duchin et al.’s (2017) model 
of financial asset investments, we expect that financially unconstrained/cash-rich firms can hold more 
risky assets. Unconstrained/cash-rich firms face lower expected cost of financial distress (including 
underinvestment), which allows them to shift more financial assets towards riskier asset allocations.   
H4: Risky financial asset holdings increase with firms’ financial portfolio size.   
Second, we expect that firms with high precautionary savings demand hold fewer risky assets. Since 




external financing is costly, investments in risky financial assets are less suitable for mitigating adverse 
cash flow shocks. Thus, our fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
H5: Risky financial asset holdings decrease with firms’ precautionary savings demand.   
Third, managers might gain private benefits from investing in risky assets. Managers may engage in 
risky investments to enhance their work with more exciting tasks or evolve their human capital for 
jobs elsewhere (e.g., Holmström, 1999). We expect this behavior to be more prevalent in firms with 
agency problems (i.e., those with weak corporate governance); therefore, we expect that these firms 
invest more in risky financial assets.  
H6: Risky financial asset holdings increase with agency problems / weaker governance. 
Finally, a CEO’s compensation contract might also affect the composition of firms’ financial portfolios 
in terms of risk. Option-based compensation can increase CEOs’ risk-taking incentives because they 
introduce convexities, making a CEO’s expected compensation an increasing function of firm 
performance volatility (e.g. Smith and Stulz, 1985; Hall and Murphy, 2003). Thus, our seventh 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H7: Risky financial asset holdings increase with CEOs’ option-based compensation.   
Before we empirically test our hypotheses, we define proxies for the transaction cost, precautionary 
savings and agency motives. Following the literature (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1996), we use firm size 
as a proxy for firms’ transaction costs. In addition, we use cash flow volatility, R&D expenditures 
and the market-to-book ratio as measures for firms’ precautionary saving needs (e.g., Opler et al., 
1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009). Finally, we follow the literature and employ common measures 
to proxy for the severity of agency problems between management and shareholders, using two 
measures of corporate governance quality: institutional ownership and family firm status (e.g., 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Andres, 2008). For detailed variable 





5.2. Empirical Evidence 
We examine the determinants of the size of the firms’ financial portfolios (H1-H3) using the standard 
ordinary least squares (OLS) cash model described in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). Afterwards, we 
continue by investigating the determinants of financial portfolio composition (H4-H7) using a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) model as proposed in Duchin et al. (2017). The 2SLS model mitigates the 
endogeneity concerns that may arise because the size and the composition of firms’ financial portfolios 
are jointly determined. 
 
5.2.1. Financial Portfolio Size 
We begin this section by presenting results from an OLS estimation of the standard cash model to 
test hypotheses H1-H3. In particular, we estimate the following equation: 
 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
 (1) 
Our dependent variable, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, is total financial assets in relation to book assets. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 refers to a set 
of observable firm-specific determinants of financial portfolio size, including the proxies for the 
transaction costs, precautionary savings, and agency motives, as well as some controls that were 
identified by the previous literature (e.g., Opler, 1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009). We control for 
industry and year fixed effects to absorb time-invariant differences across industries (see Section 4.3) 
and time-varying shocks that affect all firms. Moreover, we cluster standard errors at the firm level 
to adjust for heteroscedasticity and possible dependence in the residuals over time (Petersen, 2009). 
Table 5 reports the estimates of equation (1). In Panel A, the baseline specification, we examine the 
transaction costs and precautionary savings arguments (H1 and H2). In Panel B, the agency 
specification, we re-estimate these regressions with and without controls but also include different 
proxies for corporate governance (H3).  
Table 5 (Panel A) indicates that a strong negative relationship exists between firm size and financial 
portfolio size, which is consistent with the transaction cost motive. Across all the specifications, the 
estimated coefficient of firm size is uniformly negative, economically large and statistically significant. 




significant at the 1% level. The size of the estimated coefficient is similar across the alternative 
specifications in Panel A, e.g., when we add the controls (column 2: 2.2%) or the proxies for the 
precautionary savings motive (column 5: 1.6%). In our baseline specification including all controls, 
which is shown in column 5, a one-unit-point (one standard deviation) increase in firm size is 
associated with a 1.6 percentage point (0.25 standard deviation) decrease in financial asset holdings, 
which is a $439 ($852) million decrease for the average firm in our sample. 
Moreover, Table 5 reveals that a positive relationship exists between the size of firms’ financial 
portfolios and the proxies for their precautionary saving needs. This association is uniformly positive, 
highly statistically significant at the 1% (5%) level, and economically relevant across all the 
specifications. 14  For example, in column 3, the coefficient of the market-to-book ratio (the 
precautionary savings proxy that produces the most conservative results in terms of standardized 
coefficients) equals 3.4% and is statistically significant at the 5% level. When we add controls and 
firm size as a proxy for the transaction cost motive (column 5), a one-unit-point (one standard 
deviation) increase in the market-to-book ratio is associated with a 4.7 percentage point (0.28 standard 
deviation) increase in financial portfolio size, which is a $1,292 ($970) million increase for the average 
firm in our sample. The signs of the remaining controls are consistent with the results of the extant 
literature on corporate cash holdings (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009).  
<< Insert Table 5 >> 
In Panel B, we present the specifications that include the different proxies for corporate governance 
(i.e., institutional ownership and family firm status) to study the relevance of the agency motive. As 
shown in columns 6-9, we find an insignificant relation between governance and financial portfolio 
size. Neither the coefficients on institutional block holdings nor the ones on family firm status are 
significant across the different specifications – with and without additional covariates.  
                                      
14 The association between financial asset holdings and the three different precautionary saving proxies (unreported) is 




Taken together, our results suggest that the precautionary savings and the transaction costs motives 
are statistically significant and economically relevant determinants of financial portfolio size. By 
contrast, we find no evidence that agency motives drive the size of firms’ financial asset holdings. Our 
results are largely consistent with the previous findings from the US. 
 
5.2.2. Financial Portfolio Composition 
After analyzing the determinants of financial portfolio size, we continue with examining the 
hypotheses regarding financial portfolio composition (H4-H7). Our regression equation is:  
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
, (2) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the ratio of firms’ risky assets to their total financial assets, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗  is the 
predicted value of firms’ financial portfolio size based on the first-stage model, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 refers to firm-
specific determinants of financial portfolio composition.  
Equation (2) is similar to equation (1) but has two major differences. First, we use firms’ risky 
financial asset holdings as the dependent variable. Second, we include financial portfolio size 
(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ ) as an additional explanatory variable (see H4). Since these modifications result in a 
regression equation that contains the (endogenous) size of the financial portfolio (see Section 5.2.1), 
we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model. This model aims at mitigating concerns 
about the joint determination of financial portfolio size and its composition. We exploit unexpected 
cash flow shocks as an instrument for actual portfolio size (see Duchin et al., 2017). The identifying 
assumption is that (arguably random) unexpected cash flow shocks affect the size of the firm’s 
financial asset portfolio (relevance condition), but predict the dependent variable only through the 
instrumented variable, portfolio size (exclusion condition).15 
Table 6 reports the OLS and 2SLS second-stage regression estimates of the empirical model. In Panel 
A, we show the results of our baseline specification (H4 and H5). In Panel B, the agency specification, 
                                      




we re-estimate this regression but also include different proxies for corporate governance (H6). Finally, 
in Panel C, we present the results from a third model, the CEO specification, which additionally 
analyzes managerial risk-taking incentives (H7) and standard CEO characteristics such as age, tenure, 
and gender on a slightly smaller sample.16 
Column 2 reports the first stage regression estimates of our baseline specification. The coefficient of 
the instrument (i.e., unexpected cash flow) is both economically and statistically significant and passes 
the test for weak instruments (see, for example Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002) with an F-value of 
12.1. This result supports the instrument relevance condition. For brevity, we omit the first stage 
results of the other specifications, which are qualitatively and statistically similar.  
Column 3 shows the second-stage estimation results. The results reveal that there is a strong positive 
relationship between firms’ risky financial asset holdings and the size of their financial portfolios (H4). 
The association is statistically different from zero at the 5% level; additionally, the estimated 
coefficient is of sizable economic magnitude. A one percentage point increase in portfolio size is 
associated with an economically substantial increase of 2.2 percentage points in risky assets. This 
effect is roughly 7 times larger than that in the US. Considering standardized coefficients, a one 
standard deviation increase in financial portfolio size is associated with a 1.47 standard deviation 
increase in risky financial assets, which corresponds to a large increase of about $500 million for the 
average firm in our sample. The size of the estimated coefficient is similar across the alternative 
second-stage 2SLS specifications (columns 4-6). In column 3, we also find a strong relationship 
between firm size and risky asset holdings. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level and 
implies a 9.9 percentage point (0.53 standard deviation) increase in risky assets for a standard 
deviation increase in firm size, with similar coefficients in the alternative specifications (columns 4-6). 
Consistent with H5, we find a statistically significant negative, though weaker, relationship between 
                                      
16 Due to data availability, our sample size reduces by about 20% when we include the measure of risk-taking, option-based 
compensation. The German Executive Compensation Disclosure Act (2005) requires publicly listed firms to disclose the 
compensation of their management boards in their annual reports. However, the act also allows firms to opt out of these 




firms’ risky financial asset holdings and the proxies for precautionary savings needs (cash flow 
volatility, R&D expenditures, and market-to-book ratios).  
<< Insert Table 6 >> 
In Panel B, we show the results from similar regression specifications that, in addition, include the 
different proxies for corporate governance (i.e., institutional ownership and family firm status). Similar 
to our results for firms’ financial asset size, we find no evidence that the agency motive is prevalent 
for firms’ financial portfolio composition. The coefficients of the governance proxies are statistically 
insignificant and close to zero.  
Finally, in Panel C, we present the results from our CEO specification that includes the proxy for 
managerial risk-taking incentives (the CEOs’ annual option-based compensation as a percentage of 
total compensation)17 and standard CEO characteristics such as age, tenure, and gender. As shown 
in column 6, we find an insignificant relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and risky 
financial asset holdings. The estimated coefficient is neither economically nor statistically significant. 
Additionally, none of the CEO characteristics (i.e., age, tenure, and gender; unreported) has a 
significant impact on the composition of firms’ financial portfolios in Germany. 
Overall, our results suggest that financially unconstrained firms with large financial portfolios and 
low precautionary savings needs hold relatively more financial assets in risky asset classes. On the 
other hand, we find no evidence that managerial risk-taking incentives as well as agency motives drive 
the composition of firms’ financial portfolios with respect to risk. Our results are largely in contrast 
to the previous findings from the US. Duchin et al. (2017) suggest that managerial risk-taking 
incentives and the agency motive affect firms’ financial portfolio composition. In addition, their 
empirical evidence on the effect of the precautionary savings motive (to hold less risky assets) is 
inconclusive.  
                                      
17 To calculate this measure, we hand-collect data for CEOs of TecDAX firms and use the executive compensation database 
from Beck, Friedl, and Schäfer (2020) for CEOs of DAX and MDAX firms. Earlier studies typically use vega (the sensitivity 
of a CEO’s option holdings or total wealth to a change in stock price volatility) as a measure of CEO risk-taking incentives 
(e.g. Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006), which we cannot construct given limited data availability 




6. Decomposition of Differences in Financial Portfolio Composition 
Our results thus far indicate that there are marked mean outcome differences in risky financial asset 
holdings between German and US firms (investing 11.6% and 16.6%, respectively, of their financial 
assets in risky asset classes). However, since German firms are, e.g., on average smaller and operate 
in different industries than firms in the US (see the previous sections), concerns may arise that our 
on-average findings are mainly driven by differences in firm characteristics. For example, and as we 
showed in the multivariate regressions, as larger firms hold more risky assets in their financial 
portfolios, the observed differences could be simply a consequence of US firms, e.g., being larger on 
average. To account for this concern, we use our regression results and estimate a Blinder-Oaxaca 
(Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) decomposition to break down the cross-country differences in risky 
financial assets into an explained component (resulting from compositional differences in firm 
characteristics, the “covariate effect”) and an unexplained component (resulting from effect size 
differences in regression point estimates; including differences in the intercept, the “coefficient 
effect”).18 The literature typically interprets this unexplained component as an effect similar to a 
treatment effect (e.g., Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 2011) – in our case, a “treatment effect” of US-
specific conditions on firms’ financial portfolios. 
Specifically, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition asks the counterfactual question of what the mean 
outcome difference in risky financial assets would be if the (empirical) relationship between firm 
characteristics and risky financial asset holdings of the German firms stayed the same but their 
average firm characteristics were identical to those in the US. The difference between the observed 
mean of the average firm in Germany and the predicted mean of the counterfactual firm (with mean 
US firm characteristics) is the explained component in Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. The remaining 
difference is the unexplained component, which results from country-specific structural differences 
                                      
18 This methodology is relatively new to empirical corporate finance, but it is already well known from the field of labor 
economics. The works of Füss, Gehrig, and Rindler (2016) and Mueller and Yannelis (2019) are among the first papers that 
apply this methodology to finance. Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) provide a comprehensive survey discussing 




that link observed firm characteristics to the outcome.19 Figure 3 shows the key finding of the 
decomposition and compares risky financial asset holdings of German firms to that of US firms. The 
figure reveals that compositional differences explain 2.0 percentage points of the 5.0 percentage point 
gap in risky financial assets. However, after accounting for these compositional differences (i.e., the 
differences in the distribution of the covariates),  German firms still invest 3 percentage points (or 
18% in relative terms) less of their financial portfolio in risky assets than US firms. This finding 
suggests that structural differences explain the majority of the observed outcome differences in firms’ 
risky financial asset holdings between both countries. 
 
Figure 3. The figure compares the level of risky financial assets (i.e., the ratio of risky financial assets to 
total financial assets) of the average firm in Germany and the US using a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. 
That is, the figure decomposes the observed risky financial asset gap into an explained, compositional, 
component and an unexplained component driven by country-specific conditions. Germany* represents 
the predicted mean of a counterfactual firm (with mean US firm characteristics). Data on risky financial 
asset holdings of US firms are from Duchin et al. (2017).  
 
Table 7 shows the results from the detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. With this analysis, we 
dissect the respective contributions of each covariate to the composition effect (the explained 
                                      
19 Appendix A4 contains more details about the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. 




component).20 In other words, the detailed decomposition separates the explained component (2.0 
percentage points, see Figure 3) into portions attributable to the individual explanatory variables.  
We begin with examining the effect of firm size and financial portfolio size. These two covariates 
explain large parts of the risky financial assets gap (1.6 and 0.8 percentage points respectively). For 
example, since large German firms hold relatively more risky financial assets (column 1, row 1) and 
US firms are on-average larger than firms in Germany (column 4, row 1), the ratio of risky financial 
assets in Germany would increase by 1.6 percentage points (column 5, row 1) if we account for 
compositional differences in these variables. Another covariate that contributes strongly to the risky 
financial asset gap, is the indicator of being in the consumer industry. This industry indicator explains 
1.9 percentage points of the 5.0 percentage point gap in risky financial assets (column 5, row 12). The 
reason is that the share of firms in this sector is relatively large in the US (26% of firms) compared 
to the one in Germany (11%). At the same time, German consumer good firms hold 12.5% more in 
risky assets relative to the omitted category (the indicator for being in the technology industry), 
holding constant the other regressors. However, there are also firm characteristics with a negative 
impact on the explained component. For example, the precautionary savings proxies “R&D 
expenditures” and “market-to-book ratio” have a strong negative effect on the explained component. 
The reason is that US firms on-average have a higher precautionary savings demand (as measured by 
these two proxies) than firms in Germany, and German firms with a higher demand for precautionary 
savings hold relatively fewer risky financial assets. Taken together, the incremental contribution of 
covariates with a positive impact on the composition effect outweighs that of covariates with a 
negative impact, resulting in the total of 2.0 percentage points explained component (as shown in 
Figure 3).    
<< Insert Table 7 >> 
For completeness, we also perform the above analysis for financial portfolio size (see Table IA4 of the 
Internet Appendix). As presented in Section 4, financial portfolio size of the average German firm is 
only slightly lower than that of the average US firm (16.2% vs. 17.5% of book assets). The 
                                      
20 We cannot present detailed decomposition results for the unexplained component because the raw data from Duchin et 




decomposition results indicate that this difference almost completely disappears if we account for 
compositional differences. Therefore, the difference in financial portfolio size, which results from 
country-specific effects, is negligible.  
Overall, our results indicate that more than half of the observed difference in risky financial assets 
between German and US firms is attributable to the unexplained structural component of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition. Therefore, concerns that our results are only caused by compositional 
differences in firm characteristics are unlikely to be valid. Instead, our results are consistent with the 
view that country-specific effects, which are not present in Germany, in large part drive US results.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Using hand-collected data on financial portfolios of German firms, we show that risky financial asset 
holdings are not an anomaly unique to the US. We find that German nonfinancial firms invest an 
average of 11.6% of their financial assets in noncash and risky asset classes. Value-weighted, this 
percentage increases to more than 25% of financial assets, which is economically substantial. While 
the average German firm’s ratio of risky financial assets to total assets is substantial, it is considerably 
smaller than that of the average US firm (16.6% of financial assets). Using a Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition, which accounts for the compositional differences in firm characteristics, we find that 
the risky financial asset holding gap decreases; however, it remains at 3 percentage points. This 
remaining difference is attributable to country-specific effects that affect the relationship between firm 
characteristics and (risky) financial asset holdings. Our research design is admittedly not suitable for 
determining the underlying reasons for these country-specific effects. Future research could provide, 
in particular, a deeper examination of the specific institutional features that affect the regularities 
found in this and previous US studies. Analyzing these features requires cross-sectional (and ideally 
time-series) variation in institutional features such as accounting practices, legal environments, or tax 
codes as well as larger, more detailed international data sets (which are, unfortunately, not available 
in commercial databases). 
With our study, we also contribute by providing evidence from an independent sample, which allows 




and ours is that, in Germany, precautionary savings needs countervail firms’ incentives to hold higher 
levels of risky financial assets. In addition, and in contrast to the US, there is no evidence that agency 
problems are responsible for firms’ higher risky portfolio investments. Taken together, these results 
contradict the view that a breakdown of corporate governance may lead to high levels of risky financial 
asset holdings and reject concerns about potentially value-reducing activities by firm management. 
Nevertheless, similar to the US, there is a large variation in risky financial asset holdings. The ten 
firms with the largest financial portfolios, on-average, hold about 46% of their total financial portfolio 
(which includes also cash) in risky asset classes. While these risky investments provide firms with 
higher returns if they succeed, they can reduce value and lead to financial distress of firms if they fail. 
From a policy point of view, this uncertainty in corporate liquidity may be of concern if losses from 
large risky asset portfolios drag down profits from firms’ operating businesses. These concerns are 
warranted especially for large firms whose risky portfolios tend to be large.  
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, not much is known yet about how nonfinancial firms 
organize their financial asset management. Qualitative one-on-one interviews (that the authors 
conducted with senior financial executives of seven sample firms) suggest that industrial firms’ 
financial asset management processes are similar to those of real corporate investments (including 
approval thresholds, budget limits and different layers of approval; see Hoang et al., 2020). However, 
the interview evidence also suggests that asset management teams are relatively small and that firms 
provide financial managers with considerably discretion about how to spend financial resources within 
asset classes.  
Finally, our findings raise new questions on the regulation of nonfinancial firms’ asset management 
activities. Investment companies are heavily regulated (e.g., by the UCITS Directive in the EU for 
open-ended funds or the US federal securities law and the state laws for US public funds) and, in 
some jurisdictions, they must obtain a (banking) license from national financial supervisory authorities 
(e.g., in Germany). These regulations govern the pool of eligible assets, exposure limits, leverage 
restrictions, internal control as well as transparency and disclosure rules. This is in stark contrast 
with the regulation and disclosure requirements of nonfinancial firms’ asset management, which are 
minimal, despite that they manage similar amounts of financial assets as many investment funds. The 




which is substantially more than the roughly $400 million managed by the average mutual fund in 
Germany (Cremers et al., 2016). This asymmetry in the regulation of financial portfolios invites future 






Figures and Tables 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Our sample comprises all firms that were part of the HDAX from 2009 until 2012, excluding financial institutions 
(SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999), which results in 269 firm-year observations. Summary statistics 
on US industrial firms (if available) are from Duchin et al. (2017), henceforth DGHH. In addition, we report 
tests of differences in means (t-test) and medians (sign test) between firms in Germany and firms in the US. 
For variable definitions, see Table A2 of the Appendix. 
 
 (1) Germany  (2) US (DGHH)  (1)–(2) 
 Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  Mean Median 
Financial Portfolio Size 0.162 0.121 0.126  0.175 n/a n/a  -0.013*** n/a 
CHE 0.157 0.119 0.126  n/a n/a n/a  n/a n/a 
Firm Size 8.566 8.556 1.937  9.189 9.081 1.190  -0.623*** -0.525*** 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.052 0.030 0.071  0.037 0.027 0.035   0.015***  0.003  ** 
R&D Expenditures 0.025 0.005 0.038  0.042 0.006 0.074  -0.017*** -0.001*** 
Market-to-Book 1.566 1.321 0.757  1.965 1.644 1.067  -0.399*** -0.323*** 
Block Holdings 0.078 0.052 0.098  0.109 0.073 0.134  -0.031*** -0.021*** 
Family Firm Dummy 0.387 0.000 0.428  n/a n/a n/a  n/a n/a 
Cash Flow 0.087 0.081 0.053  0.093 0.088 0.061  -0.006*** -0.007*** 
Leverage 0.209 0.193 0.154  0.250 0.223 0.199  -0.041*** -0.030*** 
Dividend Dummy 0.811 1.000 0.392  0.676 1.000 0.468   0.135***  0.000*** 
Net Working Capital 0.043 0.038 0.108  0.021 0.019 0.111   0.022***  0.019*** 
Acquisition Expenses 0.015 0.001 0.038  0.021 0.001 0.049  -0.006***  0.000*** 
Capital Expenditures 0.038 0.031 0.028  0.044 0.031 0.043  -0.006***  0.000*** 





Table 2. The Size and Composition of German Firms’ Financial Portfolios 
Table 2 presents sample-wide, equally-weighted mean values for firms’ financial portfolios in relation to (i) total 
book assets, (ii) the size of total financial portfolios and (iii) CHE. Panel A shows these values by asset class, 
while Panel B shows these values according to the safe-risky-classification scheme. Asset classes above (below) 
the dotted line in Panel A are classified as safe (risky) securities. Our sample comprises all firms that were part 
of the HDAX from 2009 until 2012, excluding financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-
4999). Data on US firms’ financial portfolios are from Duchin et al. (2017), henceforth DGHH.  
Panel A: Size and Asset Types  
 
2009 – 2012  















Column  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cash and Cash Equivalents (S) 12.07 18.79 180.49 1168.97 182.26 175.41 
Deposits (S) 11.00 11.22 114.18 114.72 114.21 115.10 
Commercial Paper (S) 10.06 10.44 110.37 111.39 110.39 111.58 
Money Market Funds (S) 10.81 11.72 113.08 116.45 113.19 117.26 
Bond Investments  11.00 13.91 116.01 111.14 116.95 115.32 
    Domestic Government Bonds (S) 10.02 10.57 110.31 111.90 110.35 112.14 
    Foreign Government Bonds (R) 10.01 11.93 110.10 115.33 110.10 117.60 
    Corporate Bonds (R) 10.11 11.41 110.35 113.91 110.40 115.58 
    Other Foreign Gov./Corporate Bonds (R) 10.86 111- 115.25 1111- 116.10 1111- 
Equity Investments  10.03 10.25 110.18 111.43 110.19 112.96 
    Mutual Funds (R) 10.02 10.02 110.08 110.12 110.08 110.14 
    Equities (R) 10.01 10.23  10.10 111.31 110.11 112.82 
Asset-Backed Securities (R) 111- 10.42 1111- 111.40 1111- 112.03 
Other Securities (R) 10.59 10.77 112.87 114.51 113.14 117.27 
Aggregated Accounts (R) 10.65 111- 112.82 1111- 113.32 1111- 
Total Financial Assets  16.21 17.52 100.00 100.00 103.65 116.93 
 
Panel B: Composition According to the Safe-Risky-Classification Scheme 
 














Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Safe Financial Assets 13.96 12.74 88.43 83.43 90.40 91.49 
Risky Financial Assets  2.25  4.78 11.57 16.57 13.25 25.44 




Table 3. Distribution of Risky Financial Portfolio Size at the Firm-Level 
Table 3 shows the equally-weighted average level of risky financial asset holdings for each quintile of our sample 
grouped by firms’ investment in (Panel A) risky financial assets relative to financial assets and (Panel B) risky 
financial assets relative to book assets. For all panels we report the within-quintile mean for both (1) the period 
from 2009 to 2012 and (2) year 2012 only. The sample comprises all firms that were part of the HDAX from 
2009 until 2012, excluding financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). Data on US 
firms’ financial portfolios are from Duchin et al. (2017). 
 
Panel A: Risky Financial Assets / Financial Assets (in %) 





Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Risky Financial Assets/Financial Assets        
2009 – 2012  0.00 0.24 2.65 11.13 44.47 46.34 n/a 
2012 0.00 0.46 2.79 13.82 47.25 54.22 91.83 
Panel B: Risky Financial Assets / Book Assets (in %) 





Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Risky Financial Assets/Book Assets        
2009 – 2012  0.00 0.03 0.24 1.32 9.93 12.17 n/a 






Table 4. Distribution of Risky Financial Portfolio Size at the Industry-Level 
Table 4 shows the equally-weighted average level of risky financial assets relative to (i) total financial assets 
and relative to (ii) book assets for German and US firms grouped by their industry affiliation based on the 
Fama-French five-industry classification scheme. In addition, we report tests of differences in industry means 
(t-test) between German and US firms. The sample comprises all firms that were part of the HDAX from 2009 
until 2012, excluding financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). Data on US firms’ 
financial portfolios are from Duchin et al. (2017) and from Compustat.  
 
 Average Risky Financial Portfolio Size by Industry 
 Percent of Financial Assets  Percent of Book Assets 
 US Germany Δ  US Germany Δ 
Column (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Technology 26.86 5.41 -21.45***  11.07 1.34 -9.73*** 
Healthcare 26.41 12.07 -14.34***  7.35 2.77 -4.58*** 
Consumer 11.12 18.11 -6.99***  2.21 1.63 -0.58*** 
Manufacturing 10.12 11.11 -0.99***  1.44 2.49 -1.05*** 
Other 12.34 28.41 -16.07***  1.88 5.08 -3.20*** 







Table 5. Determinants of German Firms’ Financial Portfolio Size 
Table 5 reports OLS regression estimates explaining the determinants of German industrial firms’ financial portfolio size. Panel A (columns 1-5) show 
our baseline specification regressing financial asset holdings on the proxies for the transaction costs and the precautionary savings motive as well as a 
vector of additional controls. Panel B (columns 6-11) show our agency specification, which additionally includes corporate governance proxies – 
institutional block holdings and family firm status. The sample comprises all firms that were part of the HDAX from 2009 until 2012, excluding financial 
institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). All regressions include industry- and year-fixed effects. Standard errors (in brackets) are 
heteroscedasticity consistent and clustered at the firm level.  
 




Panel A: Baseline Specification  Panel B: Agency Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Transaction Cost Motive            




  -0.016*** 
[0.005] 




Precautionary Savings Motive            






























Agency Motive            









Controls            































































Industry FE  X X X X X  X X X X 
Year FE  X X X X X  X X X X 
Nobs  269 269 269 269 269  269 269 269 269 
Adjusted R2  0.167 0.337 0.396 0.505 0.540  0.003 0.002 0.540 0.544 






Table 6. Determinants of German Firms’ Financial Portfolio Composition 
Table 6 reports the 2SLS regression estimates explaining the determinants of German industrial firms’ financial 
portfolio composition. Panel A shows our baseline specification regressing risky financial asset holdings on the 
proxies for the precautionary savings motive, financial portfolio size as well as a vector of additional controls. 
Panel B shows our agency specification. Panel C shows our CEO specification, which additionally includes CEO 
characteristics such as age, tenure and gender. The sample comprises all firms that were part of the HDAX 
from 2009 until 2012, excluding financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). In addition, 
we exclude firm-year observations with missing managerial compensation data as well as firm-year observations 
with two CEOs (i.e., Co-CEOs), when analyzing option-based compensation. All regressions include industry- 




Panel A: Baseline  Panel B: Agency  Panel C: CEO 
OLS 
2SLS -  
First Stage 
2SLS -  
Second Stage 
 
2SLS -  
Second Stage 
 
2SLS -  
Second Stage 
Column (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
         
Financial Portfolio Size 0.603** 
[0.242] 
       
Unexpected Cash Flow   0.445*** 
[0.128] 
      




















Precautionary Savings Motive         




































Agency Motive         
 Block Holdings     0.029 
[0.256] 
   
 Family Firm Dummy      0.010 
[0.039] 
  
Risk-Taking Motive         
 Option-Based Compensation        0.089 
[0166] 
Other Controls X X X  X X  X 
CEO Characteristics        X 
Industry FE X X X  X X  X 
Year FE X X X  X X  X 
Nobs 269 269 269  269 269  217 
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.549 0.126  0.122 0.118  0.120 





Table 7. Firms’ Risky Financial Asset Holdings: Detailed Decomposition  
Table 7 reports detailed decomposition results of German and US firms’ risky financial asset holdings (defined 
as the share of risky assets in firms’ financial portfolio). We use a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Column 1 
shows the OLS regression coefficients for Germany. Columns 2-4 show the mean covariate values of the average 
firm in Germany and the US, while column 5 shows the contribution of each covariate to the composition effect 
(explained component). The sample comprises all firms that were part of the HDAX from 2009 until 2012, 
excluding financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). Data on covariates of US firms 
are from Duchin et al. (2017), henceforth DGHH, and from Compustat. 
 
Model Detailed Decomposition of the Explained Component 
 OLS Regression 
Coefficient/ 
Effect Size (DE) 
 Mean Firm Characteristics  Contribution of Each 
Covariate to the 
Explained Component  US (DGHH) DE Δ (US-DE)  
Column (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
        
Firm Size 0.026  9.189 8.566 0.623  0.016 
Financial Portfolio Size 0.602  0.175 0.162 0.013  0.008 
Precautionary Savings Motive        
  Cash Flow Volatility -0.325  0.037 0.052 -0.015  0.005 
  Market-to-Book -0.032  1.965 1.566 0.399  -0.013 
  R&D Expenditures -0.829  0.042 0.025 0.017  -0.014 
Controls        
  Net Working Capital -0.296  0.021 0.043 -0.022  0.007 
  Capital Expenditures 0.702  0.044 0.038 0.006  0.005 
  Dividend Dummy -0.003  0.676 0.811 -0.135  0.000 
  Cash Flow -0.106  0.093 0.087 0.006  -0.001 
  Acquisition Expenses -0.137  0.021 0.015 0.006  -0.001 
  Leverage -0.184  0.250 0.209 0.041  -0.008 
Industry Effects        
  Consumer  -0.125  0.262 0.111 -0.151   0.019 
  Manufacturing  -0.031  0.247 0.370 -0.123  -0.004 
  Healthcare  -0.105  0.093 0.133 -0.040  -0.004 
  Other  -0.104  0.122 0.078 0.044  -0.005 







A1. Data Collection Process 
We hand-collect comprehensive data on the financial asset holdings of firms, exploiting the balance 
sheets and footnotes of firms’ annual reports. First, we gather data on firms’ financial assets using 
their fair value measurement footnotes. IAS 39 / IFRS 7 require firms to disclose the fair value amount 
of their financial assets categorized by appropriate asset classes. Second, we use firms’ annual reports 
to identify the exact securities included in the reported asset classes and evaluate whether these assets 
are nonoperating financial assets. Finally, as firms sometimes also disclose information regarding their 
financial asset holdings in their balance sheets, we supplement our data with the additional 
information from firms’ balance sheets if necessary. 
We use a representative example to illustrate our data collection process in detail: the 2011 annual 
report of SAP. Figure A1 shows the fair value measurement footnote. The footnote tabulates SAP’s 
financial assets and its liabilities at fair value. Following Duchin et al. (2017), we focus our analysis 
on firms’ total nonoperating financial assets excluding derivatives.  
 
Figure A1. This figure shows SAP’s 2011 fair value measurement footnote. SAP invested €39 million of 
its financial assets in debt investments and another €400 million in equity investments. Source: SAP 
annual report 2011, p. 246 
 




Figure A1 reveals that in 2011, SAP invested €39 million of its financial assets in debt investments 
and another €400 million in equity investments, resulting in €439 million available-for-sale financial 
assets. SAP’s annual report classifies its available-for-sale financial assets as nonoperating “[…] debt 
investments in German government bonds and equity investments in listed and unlisted securities.” 
(SAP annual report 2011, p. 209) Hence, we include both values – €39 million in domestic government 
bonds and €400 million in equities – in our 2011 financial portfolio measure for SAP. 
Finally, we determine whether SAP discloses additional nonoperating financial assets in its balance 
sheet. In doing this, we identify €4.97 billion in cash and cash equivalents that is not tabulated in 
SAP’s fair value measurement footnote. Thus, we also include this amount in our 2011 financial 
portfolio measure for SAP. In the end, SAP’s nonoperating financial portfolio consists of €4.97 billion 




A2. Variable Definitions 
We adopt the variable definitions of Duchin et al. (2017).  
 
Variable Definition Source 
Size Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total book assets 
(IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS) in million US-Dollar. 
CapitalIQ 
Cash Flow Cash flow is defined as EBITDA (IQ_EBITDA) minus interest 
(IQ_CASH_INTEREST) and taxes (IQ_CASH_TAXES) divided by total 
book assets (IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS). 
CapitalIQ 
Cash Flow Volatility Cash flow volatility is defined as the 10-year rolling window standard deviation 
of cash flow (see definition above). 
CapitalIQ 
R&D Expenditures R&D expenditures is defined as research and development expenses 
(IQ_RD_EXP), assigned zero for missing R&D data, divided by total book 
assets (IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS). 
CapitalIQ 
Market-to-Book Market-to-book is the market value of firm assets, and it is defined as total book 
assets (IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS) minus book equity (IQ_TOTAL_EQUITY) 
plus market value of equity (IQ_MARKETCAP) divided by total book assets 
(IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS). 
CapitalIQ 
Leverage Leverage is defined as total book debt (IQ_TOTAL_DEBT) divided by total 
book assets (IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS). 
CapitalIQ 
Dividend Dummy The dividend dummy is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm paid 
cash dividends in a given fiscal year; otherwise, it is set to zero. 
CapitalIQ 
Net Working Capital Net working capital is defined as current book assets (IQ_TOTAL_CA) minus 
current book liabilities (IQ_TOTAL_CL) divided by total book assets 
(IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS). 
CapitalIQ 
Acquisition Expenditures Acquisition expenditures is defined as cash acquisitions 
(IQ_CASH_ACQUIRE_CF) divided by total book assets 
(IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS). 
CapitalIQ 
Capital Expenditures Capital expenditures is defined as capital expenditures (IQ_CAPEX) divided 
by total book assets (IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS). 
CapitalIQ 
Block Holdings Block holdings is defined as the sum of all ownership positions of institutional 
investors greater than 5% held in the latest quarter of the respective fiscal year. 
CapitalIQ 
Family Firm Dummy The family firm dummy is an indicator variable set to one if a firm is a family 
firm according to Shleifer and Vishny (1986); otherwise, it is set to zero. 
CapitalIQ 
Option-Based Compensation Option-based compensation is the share of a CEO’s annual option-based 
compensation in relation to his or her total compensation.  
Beck, Friedl, and 
Schäfer (2020) 





Tenure Tenure corresponds to the length of time that a given firm’s CEO has been with 
the firm (in years) for a given fiscal year. 
Beck, Friedl, and 
Schäfer (2020) 
Female Female is an indicator variable that is set to one if the CEO of a firm is a 
woman; otherwise, it is set to zero. 







A3. The Value-Weighted Composition of German Firms’ Financial Portfolios  
Table A3 reports value-weighted mean values for financial portfolios of German and US firms by asset class in 
relation to (i) total book assets, (ii) the size of total financial asset portfolios and (iii) CHE according to the 
safe-risky-classification scheme. Our sample comprises all firms that were part of the HDAX from 2009 until 
2012, excluding financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). Data on US firms’ financial 
portfolios are from Duchin et al. (2017), henceforth DGHH, and comprise year 2012 only.  
 
2009-2012 
Percent of  
Book Assets 
Percent of  
Financial Assets 









Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cash and Cash Equivalents 6.90 6.78 70.97 45.23 74.70 56.36 
Deposits 0.19 0.54 01.95 3.60 02.12 14.49 
Commercial Paper 0.03 0.30 00.25 2.01 00.27 12.51 
Money Market Funds 0.10 0.73 01.08 4.90 01.14 16.10 
Bond Investments 













Total Safe Financial Assets 7.26 9.24 074.61 61.67 78.62 76.83 
Bond Investments 
    Foreign Government Bonds 
    Corporate Bonds 


























    Mutual Funds 



















Asset-Backed Securities - 0.53 - 3.55 - 4.43 
Other Securities 0.20 0.99 002.10 6.53 12.21 8.14 
Aggregated Accounts 0.56 - 005.81 - 16.11 - 
Total Risky Financial Assets 2.47 5.75 025.39 38.33 26.75 47.77 






A4. Empirical Design – Decomposition of Mean Outcome Differences 
To address concerns that our cross-country results are only driven by differences in firm characteristics, 
we decompose the observed (risky) financial asset difference between German (group A; base group) 
and US (group B) firms using a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). We 
consider the case of financial asset holdings as the outcome variable. Variable definitions are in Table 
A2 of the Appendix. 
The overall difference in 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 between groups 𝐵𝐵 and 𝐴𝐴, 
∆ = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵������������������������������������������������ − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴������������������������������������������������ , 
can be written as: 











where 𝛼𝛼?̂?𝑔,0 and 𝛽𝛽?̂?𝑔,𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽𝐽) represent the intercept and slope coefficients of the regressions for 
groups 𝑔𝑔 = 𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵. 𝑋𝑋����𝑔𝑔,𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽𝐽) are the respective average values of the firm-level characteristics 
determining firms’ financial asset holdings for groups 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵.  
The first component in equation (A1) is what is commonly referred to as the explained component, 
which results from compositional differences in firm characteristics. The second component is the 
unexplained component. This unexplained component corresponds to differences in the effect size or 
the intercept of the regression point estimates, but also subsumes effects of differences in unobservable 
predictors. The literature typically interprets the unexplained component as an effect similar to a 
treatment effect (e.g., Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 2011). 
We begin the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by fitting a regression model to the base group using the 
relevant determinants of financial asset holdings as covariates. Afterwards, we predict the outcome 
for the average firm in group 𝐴𝐴 as if they had the same mean characteristics as the average firm in 
group 𝐵𝐵. The difference between this predicted mean and the observed mean for the average firm in 
group 𝐴𝐴 is the explained difference between the two groups. The remainder of the original between-
group difference of the average firms in groups 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 corresponds to the unexplained component. 
To further divide the explained difference into portions attributable to the differing endowments of 
the explanatory variables, we calculate (𝑋𝑋����𝐵𝐵,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑋𝑋����𝐴𝐴,𝑗𝑗)𝛽𝛽?̂?𝐴,𝑗𝑗 for each covariate 𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽). This 
value represents the respective contribution of the 𝑗𝑗th covariate to the compositional difference 
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IA1. Comparison of IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP with Respect to the Fair Value Measurement 
of Financial Instruments 
 
Topic IAS 39 and IFRS 7 
Valid for the sample period from 
2009 to 2012 
US-GAAP and ASC820 
Introduced as SFAS 157 in 2009 
Amended in 2011 as ASC820 
Comment 
Fair Value IAS 39.9: “Fair value is the 
amount for which an asset could 
be exchanged, or a liability 
settled, between knowledgeable, 
willing parties in an arm's length 
transaction.” (Deloitte, 2012) 
ASC 820 (SFAS 157): “Fair value 
is the price that would be received 
to sell an asset […] in an orderly 
transaction between market 
participants at the measurement 
date.” (Bauce et al., 2017) 
Identical fair value definitions in 
IFRS and US-GAAP. 
Valuation Technique IAS 39 Appendix A, paragraphs 
AG69-82: The valuation 
techniques used to determine fair 
value are as follows: 
1.) Market approach 
2.) Income approach 
3.) Cost approach 
ASC 820-10-35: The valuation 
techniques used to determine the 
fair value of financial assets are as 
follows: 
1.) Market approach 
2.) Income approach 
3.) Cost approach 
Identical valuation approaches for 
the fair value of financial 
instruments in IFRS and US-
GAAP. 
Inputs to Valuation 
Technique 
IFRS 7.27A-27B: Introduction of 
“[…] 3 levels of inputs based on the 
lowest level of input significant to 
the overall fair value: 
Level 1 – quoted prices for similar 
instruments 
Level 2 – directly observable 
market inputs other than Level 1 
inputs 
Level 3 – inputs not based on 
observable market data” 
(Deloitte, 2014) 
ASC 820-10-20: Following Bauce 
et al. (2017), ASC820 classifies the 
required valuation inputs 
according to three different levels: 
Level 1 – unadjusted quoted prices 
for similar assets 
Level 2 – market inputs other 
than quoted prices (i.e., level 1) 
that are observable for the asset 
Level 3 – inputs for the asset 
unobservable on the market 
Identical input categorizations for 
the valuation of fair value 
financial instruments in IFRS and 
US-GAAP. 
Disclosure IFRS7.25-30: The following 
minimum disclosures “[…] about 
fair values of each class of 
financial asset and financial   
liability […]” (Deloitte, 2014) are 
required after initial recognition: 
1.) the fair value measurement at 
the end of each reporting period 
2.) the level of the fair value 
hierarchy used to determine the 
fair value measurements (Level 1, 
2 or 3) 
ASC820-50-1: An entity must 
disclose the following information 
after initial recognition for each 
class of its financial assets and 
liabilities measured at fair value in 
their financial statement: 
1.) the fair value measurement at 
the end of each reporting period 
2.) the level of the fair value 
hierarchy used to determine the 
fair value measurements (Level 1, 
2 or 3) 
Identical disclosure requirements 
with regard to fair value financial 





Level of Disclosure 
Disaggregation 
IFRS 7.6: “Certain other 
disclosures are required by class of 
financial instrument (for example 
the fair value of financial assets 
and financial liabilities). For those 
disclosures an entity must group 
its financial instruments into 
classes of similar instruments as 
appropriate to the nature of the 
information presented.” (Deloitte, 
2014) 
Determining appropriate classes 
for the assets and liabilities that 
must be disclosed requires firms to 
make judgments. 
SFAS 157.32: Equity and debt 
security classes shall be specified 
as principal security types in 
accordance with paragraph 19 of 
FASB Statement No.115. 
SFAS 115.19: Defines principal 
security types as follows: 
• Equity securities, 
• Debt securities issued by the 
U.S. Treasury and other U.S. 
government corporations and 
agencies, 
• Debt securities issued by states 
of the United States and 
political subdivisions of the 
states, 
• Debt securities issued by 
foreign governments, 
• Corporate debt securities, 
• Mortgage-backed securities, 
• Other debt securities. 
US-GAAP defines the classes of 
financial assets to be disclosed at 
fair value. 
IFRS does not define these classes. 
Nevertheless, both accounting 
standards require the disclosure of 
fair value financial asset classes 
and are therefore comparable in 
terms of the level of disclosure 










IA2. The Composition of Firms’ Financial Portfolios in the Year 2018 
Table IA2 reports equally-weighted mean values for financial portfolios of German firms during the original 
sample period (2009 – 2012) and in 2018 by asset class in relation to (i) total book assets and (ii) the size of 
total financial asset portfolios according to the safe-risky-classification scheme. We report tests of differences 
in means (t-test) between the two sample periods. Our sample comprises all firms that were part of the HDAX 
from 2009 until 2012, excluding financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999).  
 
 Percent of Book Assets 
 
Percent of Financial Assets 
Sample Period 2009-2012 2018 Difference 
 
2009-2012 2018 Difference 
Column (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Cash and Cash Equivalents 12.07 110.60 1-1.47***  1180.49 175.06 1-5.43*** 
Deposits 11.00 12.09 111.09***  114.18 118.96 114.78*** 
Commercial Paper 10.06 10.29 110.23***  110.37 111.45 111.08*** 
Money Market Funds 10.81 10.55 1-0.26***  113.08 111.63 1-1.45*** 
Bond Investments 













Total Safe Financial Assets 113.96 113.57 1-0.39***  188.43 187.57 1-0.86*** 
Bond Investments 
    Foreign Government Bonds 
    Corporate Bonds 


























    Mutual Funds 



















Asset-Backed Securities 111- - 1111-***  - 1111- 1- 
Other Securities 10.59 10.21 1-0.38***  112.87 112.61 1-0.26*** 
Aggregated Accounts 10.65 10.55 1-0.10***  112.82 113.40 110.58*** 
Total Risky Financial Assets 12.25 12.17 1-0.08***  1111.57 112.43 110.86*** 
Total Financial Assets 16.21 15.74 1-0.47***  1100.00 100.00 110.00*** 





IA3. Empirical Design – Determinants of German Firms’ Financial Portfolio Composition  
We employ a 2SLS regression model as proposed in Duchin et al. (2017) to analyze the determinants 
of German firms’ financial portfolio composition (H4-H7). This model aims to address endogeneity 
concerns about the joint determination of firms’ financial portfolio size and their composition (i.e., 
firms’ risky financial asset holdings; 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹). 
The 2SLS regression exploits unexpected cash flow shocks as an instrument for actual financial 
portfolio size (see Duchin et al., 2017). Unexpected cash flow shocks (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 ) are the 
residuals (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) from the following time-series model: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2)� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3)� 
                            + 𝛽𝛽3�𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3 − 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−4)� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(IA1) 
To mitigate the impact of outliers on our results, we winsorize 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹  at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Afterwards, we use 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹  as an instrument to determine the size of firms’ 
financial portfolios in the following model: 
 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + �𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇
𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
 (IA2) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents a vector containing the traditional determinants of cash holdings used in the 
literature (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). Moreover, we include industry and 
year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm level. For our second stage model, we use 
the fitted financial portfolio size values from equation (IA2) and estimate the following regression: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + �𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅
𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
 (IA3) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the ratio of a firm’s risky financial assets to its total financial assets. 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗  
is the predicted value of a firm’s financial portfolio size based on the first-stage model. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents 
the vector of explanatory variables. We again control for industry and year fixed effects and cluster 
standard errors at the firm level. 




IA4. Firms’ Financial Asset Holdings: Decomposition Results  
Table IA4 reports decomposition results of German and US firms’ financial portfolio size (i.e., financial assets 
divided by total book assets). We use a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Column 1 shows the OLS regression 
coefficients for Germany. Columns 2-4 show the mean covariate values of the average firm in Germany and 
the US, while column 5 shows the contribution of each covariate to the composition effect (explained 
component). The sample comprises all firms that were part of the HDAX from 2009 until 2012, excluding 
financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). Data on covariates of US firms are from 
Duchin et al. (2017), henceforth DGHH, and from Compustat. 
 
Model Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
 OLS Regression 
Coefficient/ 
Effect Size (DE) 
 Mean Firm Characteristics  Contribution of Each 
Covariate to the 
Explained Component  US (DGHH) DE Δ (US-DE)  
Column (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
        
Transaction Cost Motive        
  Firm Size -0.016  0.175 0.162  0.013  -0.010 
Precautionary Savings Motive        
  Cash Flow Volatility  0.425  0.037 0.052 -0.015  -0.006 
  Market-to-Book  0.047  1.965 1.566  0.399   0.019 
  R&D Expenditures  1.231  0.042 0.025  0.017   0.021 
Controls        
  Net Working Capital -0.120  0.021 0.043 -0.022   0.003 
  Capital Expenditures  0.364  0.044 0.038  0.006   0.002 
  Dividend Dummy  0.016  0.676 0.811 -0.135  -0.002 
  Cash Flow -0.635  0.093 0.087  0.006  -0.004 
  Acquisition Expenses -0.431  0.021 0.015  0.006  -0.003 
  Leverage -0.218  0.250 0.209  0.041  -0.009 
Industry Effects        
  Consumer  -0.020  0.262 0.111 -0.151   0.003 
  Manufacturing  -0.001  0.247 0.370 -0.123   0.000 
  Healthcare  -0.011  0.093 0.133 -0.040   0.000 
  Other  -0.080  0.122 0.078  0.044  -0.004 
Total Explained Component        0.018 
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